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CREDIT CARDS, ATTORNEY’S FEES, AND THE
PUTATIVE DEBTOR: A PYRRHIC VICTORY?
PUTATIVE DEBTORS MAY WIN THE BATTLE BUT
NEVERTHELESS LOSE THE WAR
Jennifer M. Smith*
“Another such victory over the Romans and we are undone.”
Pyrrhus, the Greek king

I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, scholars have written about credit cards and attorney’s fees, but
rarely together. This Article addresses the current financial crises of Americans, the
credit card industry (including the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act) and attorney’s fees—perhaps a unique combination. It is based upon
an actual case that left the putative debtor in a worse financial crisis than before the
lawsuit was filed. This Article addresses the current credit card industry and its
detrimental impact on society, and it discusses the history and purpose of attorney’s
fees, as well as the pitfalls in attorney’s fee legislation. It analyzes the case study under
various state laws, with heavy emphasis on Florida and California law, then
recommends a legislative change or judicial intervention to ensure that creditors incur
financial responsibility when they erroneously sue consumers. With these changes,
consumers are made whole when they must defend themselves against small claims
lawsuits erroneously filed against them, so as not to become victims of needless debt.
II. BACKGROUND
In America, credit card debt is so pervasive that it has gained national attention
in our presidential debates.1 Indeed, during a 1996 presidential debate against thenPresident William Clinton, Senator Robert Dole stated, “Credit card debt has never
been higher.”2 Yet, notwithstanding this financial management crisis, American
consumers have become even more dependent on deficit spending via credit cards.3

* Associate Professor of Law, Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University College of Law.
Formerly partner, Holland & Knight LLP, and federal judicial law clerk to the Honorable Joseph W.
Hatchett, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. J.D., University of Miami School of Law; B.S.,
Hampton University. Professor Smith expresses sincere gratitude for the research grant provided by Florida
A&M University; the thoughtful guidance provided by Teeluck Persad, Esq., Nathanial Friends, Esq., Dr.
Wallace Rudolph, Professor Patricia Broussard, and Professor Mitchell Crusto; and the research assistance
provided by Gary Yessin (research librarian). Professor Smith also thanks her father, John Andrew Smith,
an outstanding artist, for his loving interest in her work.
1. Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 249, 250 (1997).
2. Id. (citing Clinton-Dole Debate II: Full Text of the Second Presidential Debate Between President
Clinton and Republican Candidate Bob Dole in San Diego, Calif., WALL ST. J. INTERACTIVE ED., Oct. 17,
1996, http://www.wsj.com).
3. See generally IN DEBT WE TRUST, AMERICA BEFORE THE BUBBLE BURSTS (A Danny Schechter
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Consequently, the virtually unregulated credit card industry has grown more powerful
and profitable as Americans have increased their purchasing power in a manner that
has caused them to grow poorer.4 Strapped by high interest rates, substantial late fees,
and other penalties, Americans are now swamped with credit card debt, yet are offered
little protection through federal and state laws.5
Seeking to deplete all avenues of potential revenue, credit card issuers lure highrisk borrowers into borrowing credit at usurious rates with compounded fees and
penalties, and then sue these same consumers when they are unable to pay.6 A
common “bait and switch” tactic used by credit card issuers is to entice customers with
“subprime” rates (some as low as zero percent), charge them a “transaction fee” on the
date of the loan, and increase the zero percent rate to as much as thirty percent if the
consumer is one day—or even an hour—late on a monthly payment.7 Recently, one
of the largest credit card issuers reportedly increased customer rates to as high as
twenty-eight percent without any apparent decrease in these customers’ credit scores,
and without providing an explanation to these customers for the rate increase.8

Film 2007) [hereinafter IN DEBT WE TRUST] (investigating why so many Americans are being strangled by
debt and facing imminent financial crisis).
4. Id.
5. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Are Credit Card Late Fees Unconstitutional?, 15 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 457, 460-61 (2006) (describing the decline of federal protection first by the Supreme Court decision
in Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), which allowed nationallychartered banks to circumvent state usury laws by affirming that the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C.
§ 85 (2006), authorized these banks to apply its home state’s interest rate to transactions occurring in other
states, followed by the Comptroller’s 1995 regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 (2006), which interpreted the
NBA as allowing credit card issuers administered by nationally-chartered banks to impose on customers
in any state whatever late fees are allowable by the home state of the bank, and followed by the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (2006), which granted the
same powers to federally-insured state-chartered banks that the NBA grants to nationally-chartered banks,
resulting in many banks relocating to states permitting higher interest rates, such as Delaware and South
Dakota). See also Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-47 (1996) (approving of the Office of
Comptroller of Currency’s definition of interest found in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a) (2004) to include credit
card charges such as late fees, over-limit fees, cash advances, returned check fees, and membership fees);
Carolyn Carter et al., The Credit Card Market and Regulation: In Need of Repair, 10 N.C. BANKING INST.
23, 25 (2006) (providing an overview of the consumer protection weaknesses of the Truth in Lending Act,
12 U.S.C. § 226 (2004)); Kevin G. Toh, Are Credit-Card Late Fees “Interest”? Delineating the
Preemptive Reach of Section 85 of the National Bank Act of 1864 and Section 521 of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1294, 1310 (1996) (noting
that interest rate regulation was increasingly becoming the concern of states because of the federal
government’s gradual withdrawal from the field since 1980).
6. A Big Lender’s Credit Card Trap, BUS. WK., Aug. 5, 2008, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/
Banking/CreditCardSmarts/ABigLendersCreditCardTrap.aspx (defining “subprime borrowers” as “people
with low incomes and/or bad credit histories”).
7. See infra note 51.
8. Robert Berner, A Credit Card You Want to Toss, AMERICA ONLINE, Feb. 7, 2008,
h t t p :/ / m on ey. a ol. c om / c red i t d ebt/article/business-week/_a/a-credit-card-you -wa n t -t otoss/20080207143309990001 (reporting that Bank of America’s fine print provided an “1-800” number
to obtain the reason for the rate increase, but customers stated that when they called no one could provide
an explanation, and that Bank of America confirmed that some customers may be receiving rate hikes as
part of a “periodic review” for reasons such as running higher balances with its card or other creditors, even
though the customers had no decline in credit scores).
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Because of federal laws9 and state laws10 favoring credit card issuers,11 the laborintensive nature of litigation, and the relatively small amount owed, litigation is
generally cost-prohibitive for the consumer—and credit card issuers know this. For
example, if a consumer is being sued for $1,000, unless he or she can obtain attorney’s
fees, the consumer cannot realistically pursue a defense with adequate legal
representation because of the cost of attorney’s fees. Indeed, cases in which creditors
are suing over unpaid consumer debts12 are the most common default cases.13
Many credit card issuers have adhesion agreements with consumers providing that
if the issuers must sue to collect the amount owed, then they are entitled to attorney’s
fees from the consumer. Although those provisions are generally unilateral—running
only in favor of the credit card issuer—many states have enacted bilateral or mutuality
fee-shifting provisions allowing the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees if one
of the parties could have recovered attorney’s fees under the contract.14 Despite these
laws, there are still some major gaps that are causing consumers to incur needless debt.
One major gap involves putative debtors, as credit card issuers often sue the wrong
party. This may occur as a result of the credit card issuer erroneously sending an
account statement to an individual not indebted to the credit card issuer. Because of
the presumptions favoring credit card issuers, the debtor then has to show that he or she
is not the proper party being sued. In these cases, the putative debtor is not a signatory
to the credit card agreement under which the credit card issuer is suing the putative
debtor; therefore, when the putative debtor prevails during litigation, he or she will not
be able to recover attorney’s fees under the typical state mutuality fee-shifting statutes.
But what is so significant about attorney’s fees? Legal and economic scholars
have written about attorney’s fees for decades.15 Why? When it comes to litigation,

9. See Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 460-61.
10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 950 (2008) (permitting delinquency charges without specifying
any limit); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 54-3-1, -1.1 (2008) (designating late fees as interest and declaring that
no maximum interest rate in South Dakota exists); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.63(A) (2001) (allowing late
fees irrespective of any statute or other law to the contrary).
11. See Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 460-64 (providing an historical background of credit card late fee
laws).
12. See also 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2006) (defining “consumer debt” as “debt incurred by an individual
primarily for personal, family, or household purpose”); In re Jeffares, 119 B.R. 872, 874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990) (finding debt incurred to be “consumer debt” because the funds obtained were used by the debtor “to
pay utility bills, to pay mortgage payments and to purchase food, lodging and other miscellaneous items
of a consumer nature, all of which are clearly payments of consumer needs”).
13. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 471 (6th ed. 2004) (“The most common default case
involves a creditor’s suit over an unpaid consumer debt.”). See also Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia
Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 219, 243 (1975) (noting the high number of default cases in small claims court and the high number
of consumer defendants who fail to appear in court at all).
14. See infra note 135.
15. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the
Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371
(1996); Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 173 (1984); Kevin Clermont & John Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L.
REV. 529 (1978); John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I’ll be Suing You, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 157 (1989); John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473
(1981); John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW &
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the opportunity for an attorney to collect his or her fees from an opponent plays a
significant part in an attorney’s decision as to whether he or she will represent a
potential litigant who does not have the resources to pay legal fees. That is, will a
potential litigant have access to adequate legal representation? Access to legal
representation is crucial because creditors can garnish wages and attach property to
satisfy debts in some states.16
Because of the nature of the American judicial system, attorney’s fees are
substantial and account for the majority of the cost of the litigation.17 Thus, while the
chance of recovery of attorney’s fees may not seem decisive, it is in many cases. This
is particularly true in credit card debt collection cases where the amount in question is
often very small, especially compared to the attorney hours required to litigate the
case.18
This Article was inspired by an actual case, in which a credit card issuer sued a
Florida consumer, who was ultimately determined to be the wrong party, for
approximately $1,800 in small claims court.19 After almost two years of active
litigation and almost $30,000 in attorney’s fees, the consumer was adjudged to have
been the wrong party sued because he was not a signatory to the credit card agreement
with the credit card issuer. That is, there was no privity of contract between the
defendant and the credit card issuer. Lacking privity of contract, the defendant fell into
the chasm in the law that prevented him from obtaining attorney’s fees. This was
surely a classic Pyrrhic victory for this consumer as he was no longer obligated to the
credit card issuer in the amount of $1,800, but because he engaged an attorney to
defend himself, he owed more than fifteen times the amount of his original claim to his
attorney.20
This Article will address defendants’ access to legal representation when they are
sued by a purported creditor with whom they never entered into a contract. Part III
will set forth an actual case study because it accurately portrays the malady of the

CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984); Philip J. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity
System, 55 IOWA L. REV. 26 (1969); Michael F. Mayer & Wayne Stix, The Prevailing Party Should
Recover Counsel Fees, 8 AKRON L. REV. 426 (1975); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney
Fee Shifting: A Critical Review, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of
Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1984); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and
Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 55 (1982).
16. See Jane Birnbaum, Debt Relief Can Cause Headaches of Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/09/business/yourmoney/09credit.html?ex=1203224400&en=bb109b0
467dc4104&ei=5070&emc=eta1 (reporting that creditors can attach wages and property to satisfy debts
owed depending upon the states in which debtors live).
17. YEAZELL, supra note 13, at 287 (finding that high attorney’s fees result because the U.S. legal
system assigns responsibility for conducting the lawsuit to the parties and their lawyers, whereas in other
societies these responsibilities are assumed by a judge or other state official, thus resulting in lower fees and
higher taxes).
18. Courts have recognized that attorney’s fees often are much larger than the amount sued upon in
consumer credit cases and have allowed such fees because “[w]ithout the prospect of an award of attorney’s
fees as an additional incentive, it is unlikely that persons of ordinary means would choose to bring [Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act] cases.” Johnson v. Eaton, 958 F. Supp. 261, 264 (M.D. La. 1997).
19. See Unifund CCR Partners v. Smith, No. 03-20446 SP 23 (Fla. County Ct. Jul. 13, 2005).
20. Johnson, 958 F. Supp. at 264 (awarding attorney’s fees nearly twenty-seven times the damage
award).
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average person who is embroiled in litigation in small claims court (“the people’s
court”) with a mammoth credit card company that has all the rules stacked in its favor.
Part IV will discuss the credit card industry and its goals and tactics to ensure
profitability at almost any cost. Part V will discuss attorney’s fees and will analyze the
case study under various state laws. Part VI will recommend solutions to ensure that
consumers are adequately protected against “big business,” and Part VII is the
conclusion.
III. CASE STUDY: ANY CREDIT CARD COMPANY V. CONSUMER
One early morning in September 2003, a nightmare began for Mr. Consumer
(Consumer). His ex-wife called him to inform him that someone had left a package
outside of her house with his name and her address on it.21 Consumer retrieved the
package from his ex-wife. The package included a complaint filed in Small Claims
Court22 for breach of contract from a credit card issuer (Any Credit Card Company or
ACCC) for a credit card debt.23 Specifically, the complaint alleged that Consumer was
indebted to ACCC in the amount of $1,879.83, plus interest from June 2003 at a rate
of six percent per annum, $1,400 for attorney’s fees based on an hourly rate of $175.00
and an estimated minimum of four hours, and a contingency risk multiplier of 2.0 for
attorney’s fees.24 Consumer did not recall applying for or receiving a credit card from
ACCC.
Having no legal experience, Consumer contacted a lawyer. He explained that he
had not lived at the address listed on the complaint for almost three years, and had
moved from that address for a year during marital separation.
In the spirit of first seeking to understand before seeking to defend, Consumer’s
lawyer contacted ACCC’s lawyers several times and asked for any documents related
to the matter. Although ACCC’s counsel agreed to send the documents to Consumer’s
lawyer, ACCC’s lawyer failed to make these available and subsequently did not bring

21. See Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 13, at 243 (reporting studies that found that default
judgments are not always rendered on the merits, but also because defendants often do not receive
summonses due to the fact that dishonest process servers “drop them down the sewer” and swear to proper
service of the defendants).
22. Small claims courts have been described as “valuable” because they do not require an aggrieved
party to have legal experience or to obtain an attorney. See Arthur Best & Deborah Zalesne, Peace, Wealth,
Happiness, and Small Claims Courts: A Case Study, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 344 (1993-94). See also
Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, Contemporary Studies Project, The Iowa Small Claims
Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA LAW REV. 433, 439 (1990) (noting the aim of small claims courts
was to provide a “speedy, inexpensive, and simple” process to solve claims involving minor sums). The
small claims case that is the subject of this Article, however, suggests otherwise.
23. See generally In re Amendments to Florida’s Small Claims Rules, No. SC07-1724 (Fla. 2007),
available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/comments/2007/071724_Petition%20(SCRC)%208-6-07.pdf (reporting that in Duval County, Florida, almost 5000 cases were
filed in Small Claims Court between January 1, 2006, and May 31, 2006, and the vast majority were credit
card debt collection cases). See also Elwell & Carlson, supra note 22, at 441-44 (finding that the small
claims system is used primarily by businesses for debt collection, and that low and middle income
individuals have less success than wealthy individuals in small claims court because of their unfamiliarity
with the legal process and fear of appearing pro se).
24. See Unifund, No. 03-20446 SP 23.

2009]

PUTATIVE DEBTORS

177

them to the pretrial conference.25 At the pretrial conference, the judge granted the
parties an opportunity to attend mediation and ordered the parties to comply with
discovery pursuant to Small Claims Rule 7.020,26 so that Consumer’s attorney could
obtain the needed documents. Consumer’s lawyer filed an answer and formally
requested discovery to prepare for mediation and determine whether the alleged debt
was legitimate. Consumer’s lawyer informed opposing counsel that the documents
underlying the allegations in the complaint were needed prior to mediation because
Consumer did not believe that he owed ACCC any sum of money. ACCC’s lawyers
ignored the discovery deadline and did not produce the documents required under the
discovery rules. The few documents that ACCC’s lawyers brought to mediation did
not show that ACCC did, in fact, extend credit to Consumer. After contending that
Consumer was not offering to pay any money to ACCC, and that there was no evidence
of a debt incurred by Consumer, ACCC’s lawyers filed a motion for sanctions for
Consumer’s alleged refusal to engage in mediation/settlement. The court denied the
motion.
Two weeks later, ACCC’s attorney responded to the discovery requests. ACCC
produced a self-generated account statement that lacked a date as to when it was
created, a 2001 credit card statement to Consumer with his ex-wife’s address, and a
generic credit card agreement. Consumer’s lawyer filed a motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, for summary judgment. Opposing counsel did not file a response, but
appeared in court to argue the motion. The trial judge asked ACCC whether any
discovery was outstanding, and both parties responded in the negative. The trial judge
asked ACCC how Consumer opened the credit card account, and ACCC’s counsel
responded that it may have been through the internet or phone, but she did not know
for certain. Finding no evidence that Consumer entered into a contract with ACCC,
the Court granted Consumer’s motion for summary judgment.27
ACCC’s lawyers filed a motion for a rehearing, arguing that discovery remained
outstanding and unanswered, and that summary judgment was premature. The court
denied the motion. ACCC’s lawyers filed a motion to strike portions of Consumer’s
attorney’s response to the motion for a rehearing. The court denied that motion also.
ACCC appealed, arguing that (1) the trial court’s ruling was premature; (2) the
trial court improperly shifted the burden of persuasion to ACCC; (3) the lower court
improperly drew inferences against ACCC, the non-moving party; and (4) genuine
issues of fact existed. ACCC’s essential argument was that Consumer’s answers to
discovery did not resolve material issues because his answers were mainly that he had

25. See CLERK OF COURTS, 11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, SMALL
CLAIMS COURT, http://www.miami-dadeclerk.com/dadecoc/Small_Claims.asp (setting out the process for
the truncated legal proceedings in small claims court—claims up to $5,000—where cases are scheduled for
a pretrial conference after a claim is filed, parties should bring documents to assist in proving the case (but
not witnesses), and if the case does not settle, then it may be set for mediation, and if it does not settle at
mediation, then it will be set for trial).
26. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 7.020(b) (2001) (“[A]ny party represented by an attorney is subject
to discovery pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure . . . directed at said party, without order of
court.”).
27. See Unifund, No. 03-20446 SP 23 (“The Court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the
basis that there was no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim and no response or affidavit filed in opposition
to Defendant’s motion.”).
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no recollection. Therefore, while discovery was not pending at the time of the hearing,
ACCC lacked sufficient time to serve supplemental discovery as of the date of the
hearing. Further, ACCC noted that the credit card agreement upon which the lawsuit
was based was not signed by Consumer, but argued that under Regulation Z of the
Federal Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. § 226, and section 655.954 of the Florida
Statutes, a credit card agreement is a valid contract of adhesion and need not be signed
by the debtor to be valid. Finally, ACCC contended that the mere existence of a credit
card agreement and the credit card statement bearing Consumer’s name created a
genuine issue of fact, precluding summary judgment.
The appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Consumer and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.28 Specifically, the
appellate court found that the record contained a billing statement from ACCC, naming
Consumer as carrying a balance of $1,688.23 on the credit card, ACCC’s purchase and
sale agreement showing that ACCC bought the debt from the original creditor, ACCC’s
self-generated invoice to Consumer, and an admission from Consumer that although
the listed address on the bill is incorrect, he lived at that address in the past.29 Thus,
the appellate court found that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to the
identity of the debtor.30 While the court recognized that Consumer’s argument that the
credit card agreement was generic (as it did not contain his identification, address, or
signature), the court also noted that it could not ignore the conflicting evidence, which
arguably indicates that the debt was indeed his.31 Therefore, ACCC successfully
appealed, and a bench trial was set to determine whether there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to the identity of the debtor—even though the credit card agreement
did not contain Consumer’s identification, address, or signature.32
During trial, ACCC’s lawyers argued that the credit card statement mailed to
Consumer at a prior address was presumed accurate as a matter of law pursuant to
Florida law.33 However, ACCC’s designated representative testified that she had no
knowledge as to how Consumer may have opened the alleged account, acknowledged
that ACCC never received a payment from Consumer, was unaware of when Consumer
allegedly opened the account, did not know what was purchased on this account, and
further stated that ACCC never received a response to its demands of payment from
Consumer.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.

See Unifund CCR Partners v. Smith, No. 04-158AP (Fla. Cir. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 11, 2005).
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.685 (West 1985). The statute provides:
In any action brought under this part, the authentication or identification of the business
records of a credit card issuer is evidence sufficient to support a finding that the record in
question is what its proponent claims, if the records are supported by the testimony of a
designated representative of the credit card issuer. Such designated representative who has
received the business records from the custodian of such records shall be considered a
qualified witness within the meaning of § 90.803(6)(a).
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The court entered final judgment in favor of Consumer.34 The court found that the
documents to support ACCC’s claim included a purchase and sale agreement between the
debt seller (original credit card issuer) and the successor in interest (ACCC), one billing
statement addressed to Consumer dated July 2001, and an unsigned cardholder agreement.35 Finding the evidence insufficient, the court ruled in favor of Consumer.36 Even
with all of the presumptions in its favor, ACCC was unable to meet its burden of proof
and failed to establish that Consumer applied for or used the credit card at issue. That is,
ACCC did not show that Consumer was the debtor who had entered into the credit card
agreement (contract) with ACCC. However, this was a classic Pyrrhic victory.
After almost two years from when Consumer became aware of the complaint,
Consumer proved that he was not obligated to pay the credit card debt of $1,879.83.
However, he now had a legitimate debt of more than fifteen times that amount for
attorney’s fees. Consumer’s small claims litigation was not “inexpensive, simple and
speedy.”37 Without an attorney, Consumer likely would have lost due to his lack of
experience with, and expertise in, the legal system. Accordingly, Consumer would
have been liable to ACCC for the amount of the judgment plus its attorney’s fees.38
Because of the heavy use of business plaintiffs crowding the court dockets, small
claims court—also referred to as the people’s court—is often perceived as a business
court.39 Yet, the majority of cases in small claims courts are collection-type cases
brought by business-type plaintiffs.40
Moreover, unbeknownst to Consumer, ACCC had reported this bad debt to the
credit bureaus well before ACCC ever proved the debt and before Consumer was
aware of the alleged debt. Although not an issue in the case, it is quite possible that
Consumer was charged higher rates for insurance and other products because of this
reported bad debt on his credit report.41
Thus, Consumer was the biggest loser, unless he could recoup his attorney’s fees
and costs, and remove this bad debt from his credit report. Like the Greek King
Pyrrhus, Consumer was elated that he was not obligated to pay this credit card debt,
but another such victory for him would ruin him too.
The credit card industry is a powerful machine, teamed with savvy lobbyists who
convince federal and state legislators to enact laws in its favor.42 Consumer’s financial
woes also stemmed from the fact that the mutuality fee-shifting provisions for

34. See Unifund, Case No. 03-20446 SP 23.
35. Id. at 1-2.
36. Id. at 2.
37. See Best & Zalesne, supra note 22, at 346 (reporting that several states have conducted studies to
determine how their small claims courts can provide “inexpensive, simple, and speedy” justice to people
who are unfamiliar with the court system).
38. See Elwell & Carlson, supra note 22, at 449 (finding that “pro se parties going to trial may be at
a disadvantage when facing represented opponents because of the great disparity in experience and
expertise, coupled with a strong intimidation factor”).
39. See Elwell & Carlson, supra note 22, at 444 (citations omitted).
40. See Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 13, at 235 (finding that small claims courts are criticized
for serving as collection agencies to creditors).
41. SmartMoney.com, Guess Who’s Looking at Your Credit Report, Aug. 20, 2001,
http://www.smartmoney.com/consumer/index.cfm?story=20010820 (reporting that property and auto
insurers look at individuals’ credit information when underwriting policies).
42. See infra Part IV for discussion.
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attorney’s fees in most states do not go far enough to assist consumers who prevail
against the credit card industry and show that they were not a party to the contract
under which the credit card issuer filed suit.43 Thus, the combination of credit card
industry-favored laws and the inability to recover attorney’s fees in instances where the
consumer prevails is financially detrimental to wrongly accused debtors.
IV. THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY
In its aggressive attempt to increase profits through expanding the market for
borrowers, the financial services industry is wreaking havoc on many Americans.
Having saturated the market for “qualified buyers,” credit card issuers began targeting
the riskiest borrowers: the working poor (which includes a disproportionate number of
minorities), consumers with blemished credit histories, single mothers, senior citizens,
and college students.44 The benefit of this access to credit is that these consumers have
had greater access to computers, cars, homes, and other goods and services that were
heretofore beyond their financial means. The burden is that, like subprime
mortgages,45 creditors have lured these unsophisticated borrowers into a web of debt
from which they may never escape.46 However, studies have shown that Americans
have been using credit cards to bridge the gap between household earnings and
necessary goods and services, such as housing and health care, rather than on frivolous
purchases.47 Despite limiting spending to only necessities, some women’s debt has
risen to such high levels that they are even selling their biological eggs to pay their
credit card debt.48

43. See infra Part V for discussion.
44. Karin Braunsberger et al., The Effectiveness of Credit-Card Regulation for Vulnerable Consumers,
18 J. SERV. MKTG. 358, 358 (2004) (“In response to these tighter market conditions [of increased
competition in the industry], credit card issuers have begun to target non-traditional consumers, including
college students and other low-income populations, who may have little or no experience with credit cards
and often no credit history.”). See also Jessica Silver-Greenberg, The Dirty Secret of Campus Credit Cards,
BUS. WK., Sept. 6, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/sep2007/db2007095_
053822.htm (reporting that students believe that if their university is in contract with the credit card
companies to offer credit cards, then the university will seek to protect them when in fact the contracts are
profit-makers for the school and not about student services); Timothy Egan, Newly Bankrupt Raking in
Piles of Credit Card Offers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/national/
11credit.html?pagewanted=1 (reporting about a single mother who fell into insurmountable debt by using
her credit cards for necessities after cancer surgery).
45. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2040 n.3 (2007) (“The subprime market charges higher
interest rates and fees and is designed for borrowers with weaker credit.”).
46. Brian Grow & Keith Epstein, The Poverty Business, BUS. WK., May 21, 2007, http://www.
businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_21/b4035001.htm. See also CONSUMER FEDERATION OF
AMERICA, LEVIN HEARING EXPOSES WIDESPREAD CREDIT CARD ABUSES, March 7, 2007, available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Credit_Cards_Levin_Hearing_Group_Release030707.pdf (“Credit card
companies push debt on people without caring whether folks can afford to pay it back . . . . The companies
profit either way, but many Americans are being buried under a mountain of debt.”).
47. Bob Herbert, Caught in the Credit Card Vice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at A17.
48. Roni Caryn Rabin, As Demand for Donor Eggs Soars, High Prices Stir Ethical Concerns, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2007, at F6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/health/15cons.html
(“Ethicists and some women’s health advocates worry that lucrative payments are enticing young women
with credit-card debt and steep tuition bills to sell eggs without seriously evaluating the risks.”).
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Although access to credit could help the responsible, sophisticated working poor
with upward social and financial mobility, credit card issuers are preying on
individuals with a history of not paying their bills in a timely manner and those with
limited or fixed incomes.49 Low-income families are quite profitable for the industry
because they pay extraordinary rates of interest.50 Credit card issuers actually want
debtors to pay late or miss a payment so that credit card issuers can add penalties,
increase interest rates,51 and impose late payment fees.52 Lenders retort that “higher
rates are justified to account for the bigger risks posed by borrowers who have a poor
record at paying their bills on time and defaulting on debts.”53 Though the rationales
may be specious, it is clear that the credit card industry is a highly profitable industry
that makes fifty-four percent net profit from the poorest of society.54
The credit card segment of the banking industry is generally the most profitable,
earning returns higher than commercial bank loans.55 By the end of 2007, American
debt had jumped to over $900 billion.56 As consumers became increasingly cautious
in evaluating the need to incur more debt, credit card issuers were likewise increasing
their marketing and the availability of credit.57 Credit card issuers comprise some of
the top national advertisers and represent the fastest growing segment of purchased

49. See Grow & Epstein, supra note 46.
50. RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD
MARKETS 201-02 (2006).
51. See Secret History of the Credit Card: Eight Things a Credit Card User Should Know,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/eight/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2008) (reporting that
there is no limit on what credit card companies may charge for consumers who pay their bills late, even by
a few hours); Patrick McGeehan, Soaring Interest Compounds Credit Card Pain for Millions, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/21/business/21cards-web.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=
slogin&pagewanted=1&adxnnlx=1217962828-L2D+Xb0LD07PVRXauRwhJg (reporting that Discover
increased the interest rate from zero to 19.99% for a single late payment and applied the increased rate for
late payments from eleven months before the disclosure notifying the consumer of the new terms); Liz
Pulliam Weston, Credit Card Companies’ Evil Tricks, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/
CreditCardSmarts/CreditCardCompaniesEvilTricks. aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2008) (reporting that credit
card issuers take advantage of consumers by hiking their interest rates up when payment has arrived only
hours late).
52. Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer Federation of America, Consumer
Action and Consumers Union, The Effect of Current Credit Card Industry Practices on Consumers (Jan.
25, 2007), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Credit_Card_Senate_Testimony_01-07.pdf
(“Traditionally, penalty fees were designed to deter irresponsible cardholder behavior, but in recent years
fees have become primarily a revenue enhancer for credit card issues.”).
53. Vikas Bajaj & Ford Fessenden, What’s Behind the Race Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/weekinreview/04bajaj.html.
54. See IN DEBT WE TRUST, supra note 3.
55. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD
OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 2 (2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
rptcongress/creditcard/2004/ccprofit.pdf.
56. Birnbaum, supra note 16 (stating that the Federal Reserve reported that by the end of 2007,
revolving debt—an estimated ninety-five percent of which was from credit cards—jumped to a record high
of $943.5 billion).
57. See Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, supra note 52, at 3 (“[A] careful analysis of lending patterns
by credit card companies shows that aggressive and even reckless lending by issuers has played a huge role
in pushing credit card debt to record levels.”).
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advertising.58 Most credit card solicitations are by mail,59 and unsolicited credit card
mailings have increased.60 As the number of solicitations increased from 1.1 billion
in 1990 to 6.06 billion in 2005, the consumer response rate has decreased from 2.1%
to 0.3%, respectively.61
Interest rates have been at historical lows over the past several years, yet credit
card companies have used this rate reduction as a profit margin windfall rather than
passing these savings on to consumers.62 Conversely, credit cards generally have an
escalation clause that permits an increase in interest rates if the prime rate increases or
if the card issuer concludes that the cardholder has become an increased risk, the latter
being determined by late payments to the credit card issuer or delinquencies on other
non-related debt.63 Interest and penalty fees make up more than three-quarters of the
revenue of credit card issuers.64
In addition to credit card purchases, credit card companies issue checks that can
be used for cash, balance transfers, or payment of other bills. These checks are
generally promoted as having low, and in some cases zero, interest rates—for the
promotional period. What is not highlighted, however, is the fact that an upfront
transaction fee is assessed at the time the check is cashed.65 Thus, using a $1,000
check with no interest but with a transaction fee of $100 is tantamount to an annual
percentage rate (APR) of over 150 percent.66 This amount is included on the
consumer’s credit card bill and although no additional interest is charged during the
promotional period, interest may be added if payments are delinquent.
In a further effort to increase profits while continuing to steer families into
unmanageable debt, credit card issuers have reduced their costs by limiting the

58. NIELSEN MONITOR-PLUS, U.S. Advertising Spending Rose 6.3% in 2004, March 1, 2005, available
at http://nielsenmonitorplus.com (reporting that television advertising as increasing to $1.7 billion in 2004,
just under a thirty-three percent increase in 2003). See also, Robin Sidel, Card Issuer MBNA Lets the
Public Take a Peek at Its Hand, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2005, at C1 (reporting that MBNA, the Nation’s
fourth largest credit card issuer, launched its first national advertising campaign during the 2005 Super
Bowl).
59. See Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, supra note 52, at 4; Braunsberger et al., supra note 44, at 358
(recognizing that direct mail solicitations are at an all time high).
60. Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 157
(2006).
61. See Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, supra note 52, at 4.
62. Liz Pulliam Weston, 7 Credit-Card Trends that Can Cost You,
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/CreditCardSmarts/7CreditCardTrendsThatCanCostYou.aspx
(last visited Dec. 21, 2008) (reporting that credit card issuers pass on the Federal Reserve rate hikes along
with their added hikes to consumers).
63. Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer Federation of America, Consumer
Action and Consumers Union, Examining the Current Legal and Regulatory Requirements and Industry
Practices for Credit Card Issuers with Respect to Consumer Disclosures and Marketing Efforts (May 17,
2005), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/credit_card_testimony_0505.pdf at 15.
64. See Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, supra note 52, at 18.
65. See Weston, supra note 62 (reporting that one credit card issuer, Chase, recently removed its cap
of $75 on balance transfer fees for some of its low-rate offers).
66. “APR” is the one year rate that is charged for borrowing. The Free Dictionary, http://financialdictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Annual+Percentage+Rate (last visited Aug. 5, 2008) (for example, a credit
card company might charge one percent per month, but the APR is one percent multiplied by twelve
months, which equals twelve percent).
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assistance offered to consumers who are in financial trouble and are seeking credit
counseling as an alternative to bankruptcy.67 Generally, debt counseling services
negotiate lower payments with credit card issuers and then send credit card issuers
monthly payments from the consumer by electronic transfer.68 Because the credit card
issuers pay the counseling services’ fees, which is a portion of the payments the
counseling service sends to the credit card issuers, some have criticized these services
as favoring credit card issuers.69 However, this fee arrangement, known as “fair share,”
has inspired the growth of these debt counseling services, which began courting
consumers who were not having trouble paying their debts by promising them lower
interest rates, which has angered credit card issuers.70 Presently, about a thousand debt
counseling companies exist, and their reputations for engaging in honest dealings are
questionable at best.71
Additionally, more reports are identifying credit card companies’ abusive lending
practices.72 Not only are credit card issuers targeting consumers who are already in
financial distress,73 but credit card issuers have also been sued for engaging in unfair
and deceptive practices,74 including abusive debt collection.75 But abusive debt
collection practices are not novel. Indeed, tactics by debt collectors, such as calling
consumers during the night, threatening consumers, or revealing a consumer’s personal
information to neighbors or employers, provided the impetus for Congress to enact the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act76 (FDCPA) in 1977.77 The FDCPA was enacted in
an effort to eliminate debt collectors’ abusive tactics.78 Although the FDCPA has
brought relief to some consumers, who are the actual debtors, such relief would be
insufficient in the example of Any Credit Card Company v. Consumer, wherein the

67. See Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, supra note 63, at 16.
68. Liz Pulliam Weston, The Consumer’s Guide to Credit Counseling, at http://articles.
moneycentral.msn. com/Banking/YourCreditRating/TheConsumersGuideToCreditCounseling.aspx (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009).
69. Id.
70. Id. (reporting the debt counseling industry to have grown into a $7 billion industry).
71. See Birnbaum, supra note 16.
72. See Carter et al., supra note 5, at 32 (reporting various credit card abuses and noting that most of
the top ten credit card issuers are exploiting consumers).
73. See Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, supra note 52, at 10 (citing Frontline: The Secret History of
the Credit Card, PBS Televison Broadcast (Nov. 2004) (Mr. Kahr, a credit card industry consultant, reports
that the average subprime consumer will make two to three late payments in a year, resulting in late
payment penalty fees that can greatly exceed interest payments on the small lines of credit issued)).
74. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, PRESS RELEASE, STATEMENT OF
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY JOHN D. HAWKE, JR. (June 28, 2000) (reporting that Providian, a credit
card company, was ordered to pay $300 million in restitution to its subprime cardholders for unfair and
deceptive practices).
75. See Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, supra note 63, at 10 (citing Mitchell Pacelle, Pushing Plastic,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2004, at A1 (reporting that Cross Country Bank was investigated by state and federal
regulators for misleading consumers about the terms of its subprime credit card accounts and engaging in
abusive collection practices)).
76. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2006).
77. See Elwin Griffith, Identifying Some Trouble Spots in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: A
Framework for Improvement, 83 NEB. L. REV. 762, 763-64 (2005).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006).
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putative debtor has not acknowledged the debt as legitimate and is ultimately
exonerated from the debt liability.
In many cases, consumers owe as much or more in fees and penalty charges as in
the principal loan amount.79 This can usher consumers into “negative amortization,
where the principal on their credit card debt continues to rise despite making
payments.”80 To avoid hostile courts and costly settlements, “credit card issuers
introduced mandatory arbitration clauses into their contracts with cardholders.”81
Specifically, credit card issuers have been inserting pre-dispute binding mandatory
arbitration clauses, thereby waiving a consumer’s right to a court trial as a condition
of using the credit card.82 Mandatory arbitration clauses have the practical effect of
deterring consumers from challenging credit card issuers and defending themselves
because of the costs and other drawbacks.83 Scholars have written extensively on these
drawbacks and the lack of consumer protection.84 Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court has increasingly supported arbitration through its interpretation of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).85
Arbitration clauses have been criticized because these clauses are not mutually
beneficial in that they often allow credit card issuers to go to court for collection
purposes, but do not provide similarly for consumers.86 In addition, arbitration fees are
higher than court costs, arbitrators generally favor creditors and the arbitration process
(including the limiting of discovery and the inability to prosecute class actions), and
arbitration forums are often inconvenient for consumers.87 Also, with arbitration,

79. See Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett, supra note 52, at 13.
80. Id.
81. Mark Furletti, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in the Credit Card Industry 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Phila., Discussion Paper No. 03-01, Jan. 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=927078#PaperDownload.
82. Id. at 3-4.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A
Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between
Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 267 (1995); Richard B. Cappalli, Arbitration of Consumer Claims: The Sad Case of Two-Time
Victim Terry Johnson or Where Have You Gone Learned Hand, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 366 (2001);
Frederick L. Miller, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Building Barriers to Consumer
Protection, 78 MICH. B.J. 302 (1999). But see Roger S. Haydock, Forum: Arbitration vs. Litigation, STAR
TRIBUNE, Nov. 11, 2007, http://www.startribune.com/business/11763816.html.
85. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). See Johanna Harrington, Comment, To Litigate or Arbitrate? No
Matter—The Credit Card Industry is Deciding for You, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 106 (2001) (citing
several Supreme Court cases upholding arbitration clauses and noting the strong support the Court has
given to arbitration). See also Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 979 (2008) (citing Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984), which determined that “the [FAA] establishes a national policy favoring
arbitration when the parties contract for that mode of dispute resolution,” and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006), which determined that when parties agree to arbitrate all
disputes arising under their contract, questions concerning the validity of the entire contract are to be
resolved by the arbitrator in the first instance, not by a federal or state court).
86. See Furletti, supra note 81, at 5.
87. Id. See generally Miller, supra note 84 (noting that limitations often involve discovery, evidence,
remedies, rights of appeal, an option of the administering agency, and the availability of statutory attorneys
fees and injunctive relief); Carter et al., supra note 5, at 46 n.80 (reporting that the National Arbitration

2009]

PUTATIVE DEBTORS

185

consumers waive their right to a jury trial, arbitration clauses may violate a federal or
state statute authorizing consumers to go to court or bring a class action, and the
clauses are a part of adhesion contracts (“take-it-or-leave-it” contracts).88 Ultimately,
when faced with litigation and mandatory arbitration, consumers are on the losing end.
Nevertheless, these mandatory arbitration clauses—favoring creditors—have been
upheld as valid and binding by many state courts.89
Credit card issuers, being lobbying behemoths, have also maintained the favor of
Congress.90 This is evident in the most recent amendments to the bankruptcy laws.
These amendments that were debtor-friendly prior to the 2005 amendments have made
bankruptcy laws more pro-creditor.91
Despite its title, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act92
(BAPCPA) is more about creditor protection than it is about consumer protection.93
Heavy lobbying by banks, retailers, and credit card issuers eventually prompted

Forum’s documents show that consumers won in only 87 out of 19,705 arbitrations it conducted for First
USA Bank).
88. See Furletti, supra note 81, at 5.
89. See, e.g., Tickanen v. Harris & Harris, Ltd., 461 F. Supp. 2d 863, 867-68 (E.D. Wis. 2006)
(upholding arbitration agreement where credit card issuer sent subsequent notice to its cardholders that
further use of the card would bind them to arbitration). See also Phuong Cat Le, Binding Arbitration a
Loser f o r C o n su me r, SE AT T LE PO ST -IN T E LLIG E N C E R, Sep t . 2 7 , 2007,
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/money/333453_arbitration28.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2008) (reporting that
in a sample of 19,300 cases, arbitrators favored consumers only five percent of the time, but arbitration
firms used by credit card companies (Discover Financial Services, Visa, Master Card, American Express,
etc.) ruled in favor of those companies ninety-five percent of the time). But see Haydock, supra note 84
(reporting on an editorial by the managing director of the National Arbitration Forum that arbitrations are
cheaper and faster than court, and that arbitrators are “neutral and unbiased” in deciding cases); NATIONAL
ARBITRATION FORUM, CALIFORNIA CCP 1281.96 REPORTS, available at http://www.arbforum.com/main.aspx?itemID=563&hideBar=False&navID=188&news=3 (reporting on the win-loss record
of California consumer arbitrations since 2003 pursuant to CCP 1281.96).
90. Kathryn Jean Lopez, Hammering K Street, NAT’L REV., April 18, 2006, http://www.
nationalreview.com/interrogatory/qa200604180713.asp (interviewing Matthew Continetti, author of The
K Street Gang: The Rise and Fall of the Republican Machine, who commented that “lobbyists draft the
laws, design the earmarks, recruit from congressional staffs, recruit from the ranks of former legislators
themselves”).
91. Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform Gave Creditors Too Much, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/19/AR2006081900413.html. See
generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005) (detailing the progressive bankruptcy proposals
to tighten bankruptcy laws against debtors).
92. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.
23 (codified as amended in title 11 of the United States Code).
93. See generally Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology and Beyond,
84 WASH. U. L.R. 1861 (2006) (providing an overview of the history of the BAPCPA); Ronald J. Mann,
Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 376 (2007) (“The
[BAPCPA] radically altered the policies underlying consumer bankruptcy in this country, marking a
significant shift in favor of creditors.”); Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of
BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31 (2007) (discussing the major changes in consumer bankruptcy law since
the passage of BAPCPA).
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Congress to enact the BAPCPA on April 14, 2005.94 Congress had bandied with
bankruptcy reform legislation since 1997—some eight years before its enactment.95
During this time, credit card lobbyists and supporting politicians minimized the
real bankruptcy issues by the repetitive sound bite: “[B]ankruptcy is being filed as a
method of financial planning by those with the means to pay their debts.”96 The facts,
however, showed that Americans who filed bankruptcy during this time were as bad
off, or even worse off, financially than those who filed in the early 1980s.97 During this
time, the number of Americans filing bankruptcy was only about one-third of what it
was in the late 1990s when the BAPCPA was under consideration.98
Although bipartisan majorities in the House and Senate recognized significant flaws
in the American bankruptcy system at the time the BAPCPA was being considered,
opponents of the BAPCPA were convinced that it was a bill drafted by credit card
companies for their own benefit.99 Elected officials ignored women’s groups, civil rights
groups, and unions to get this bill passed.100 Among other things, the new bankruptcy law
abolishes the right of debtors to decide whether to file Chapters 7 or 13, disallows debtors
to advance their own plans for repayment, and significantly increases bankruptcy costs
by adding new requirements for debtors and their attorneys.101 Thus, scholars have
concluded for these and other reasons that the new bankruptcy law will significantly
benefit credit card issuers, rather then consumers.102
In response to the abuse by credit card issuers, governments have enacted
predatory lending laws.103 Even before those laws, however, many states attempted to
level the playing field between big corporations (e.g., credit card issuers) and
consumers by enacting legislation providing for fee-shifting in attorney’s fees.

94. See Alan Zibel, In ’07, Personal-Bankruptcy Filings Rise, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 4, 2008, at
C2 (reporting that banks, retailers and credit card companies campaigned Congress for eight years before
Congress passed the biggest changes to U.S. bankruptcy laws in a quarter-century). See also IN DEBT WE
TRUST, supra note 3 (reporting that banks, credit card companies, accounting firms and business
associations spent a combined $154 million to get this one bankruptcy bill passed); Michelle J. White,
Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 175, 175 (2007) (noting that in response to an
increase in personal bankruptcies from 1980 to 2004, “[l]enders responded with a major lobbying campaign
for bankruptcy reform that lasted nearly a decade and cost more than $100 million”).
95. See Mann, supra note 93, at 376 n.5 (noting that the credit-industry drafted bills starting with H.R.
2500, 105th Cong. (1997)).
96. Jean Braucher, Options in Consumer Bankruptcy: An American Perspective, 37 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 155, 158 (1999). See also Dickerson, supra note 93, at 1867-70 (finding that proponents of the Act
relied upon moral arguments of how shameful it was for Americans to walk away from debt so easily);
Charles J. Tabb, The Top Twenty Issues in the History of Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 9,
29 (2007) (noting the rhetoric in recent years has painted debtors as “abusers”).
97. See Braucher, supra note 96, at 158.
98. Id.
99. See Mann, supra note 93, at 376 n.1.
100. See IN DEBT WE TRUST, supra note 3.
101. See White, supra note 94, at 183-88.
102. See Mann, supra note 93, at 376. See also White, supra note 94, at 176 (explaining that after the
BAPCPA, bankruptcy was less attractive to debtors, since some were forced to repay credit card debts out
of post-bankruptcy earnings).
103. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1259-70 (2002) (defining predatory lending as a syndrome of
loan abuses benefiting mortgage brokers, securitizers, and lenders to the detriment of the borrowers).
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V. ATTORNEY’S FEES
There are generally two widely recognized rules regarding attorney’s fees. One
is the English rule, which provides that the losing party pays its own attorney’s fees
and those of the other party.104 The other is the American rule, which provides that
each party assumes responsibility for its own legal fees, irrespective of who prevails
in the lawsuit.105 Nevertheless, the historic development of what we know today as the
American rule shows the value that lawyers place on their ability to obtain attorney’s
fees.106
During colonial times, legislation allowed for fee recovery as a component of
comprehensive attorney fee regulation, and almost all of the colonies attempted
statutory regulation of attorney’s fees.107 In doing so, the legislatures prescribed the
fees a lawyer could charge and those that could be recovered from the losing party.108
This was less about shifting fees from one party to another and more about ensuring
that attorney’s fees were limited.109 Because statutory regulation limited attorney’s fees
and often resulted in an award of fees from the losing party that was considerably less
than what the client could pay, lawyers freed themselves from legislative control after
the American Revolution.110
Lawyers desired higher fees than they had been receiving, and soon the American
rule emerged because lawyers found that they could recover more from their clients
than the legislatures were allowing them to collect from losing parties.111 Thus, the
American rule has been couched as a “rough compromise” in that lawyers obtained the
ability to collect higher fees from their clients and legislative cost recovery restrictions
remained as a symbolic vestige of the prior regulatory method.112 During the twentieth
century, the phrase, “American rule,” was coined.113
The American rule is one of four models of “fee-shifting” (the others are two-way
shifting under the English rule, and one-way shifting allowing fee awards to prevailing
plaintiffs or prevailing defendants).114 The American rule has been diluted in various
aspects, but has not been repealed. Each party paid its own expenses unless a party
was deemed to have litigated in bad faith, a common fund was established through

104. See Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 15, at 373.
105. Id.
106. See generally, Leubsdorf, supra note 15 (asserting that history shows that American courts have
always allowed prevailing litigants to recover their costs from the losing party as prescribed by the
legislature and exploring the American rule’s impact on the finances of the American bar).
107. Id. at 10 (citing A.H. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 85-327 (1965)).
108. Id.
109. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to
Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1993) (“Almost all colonial legislation regarding attorney’s fees
reflect an intent to control the amount an attorney could charge the client rather than an intent to shift
attorney’s fees as costs to be collected by the prevailing litigant.”).
110. See Leubsdorf, supra note 15, at 13.
111. Id. at 13-17.
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id. at 27-28 (noting that the earliest use of the term known to author was in Arthur L. Goodhart,
Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 856 (1929)).
114. See Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, supra note 15, at 140-41.
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which the attorney could be paid, and the legislature had enacted a statute allowing for
fee recovery or parties agreed to fee recovery by contract.115 Scholars have argued that
the American rule denies access to low income litigants or those with small claims.116
But one scholar argued that the bulwark of the American rule, contingency fees,
ensures that everyone—rich or poor—has access to the courts and will be able to avail
themselves of the assistance of an attorney.117 This may be true in cases other than
small claims debt collection cases where the claim is often modest. Thus, few lawyers
will take a case on a contingency fee basis that would result, if they prevailed, in a
return less than the standard hourly fees.118
Fee statutes have varied.119 State legislatures have used fee-shifting statutes to
address problems in particular areas of litigation. For example, Florida enacted a twoway fee shifting statute in medical malpractice actions120 and Illinois enacted a one-way
fee shifting statute for a prevailing defendant credit card holder who was sued by a
credit card issuer for unauthorized use liabilities.121 Although this one-way fee shifting
to prevailing defendants is rare,122 it does exist and perhaps should be given more
thought by legislatures, especially in credit card collection cases where the amount in
question is generally small. According to one scholar, the prospect of fee-shifting
encourages attorneys to invest more in litigating the case.123
A. Analysis Under Florida Law
An analysis under Florida law of Any Credit Card Company v. Consumer, shows
the inherent unfairness in the law as it relates to misidentified debtors. With respect
to attorney’s fees, Florida follows the American rule.124 There are exceptions,
however, which allow parties to shift their share of attorney’s fees to the losing party.

115. See Leubsdsorf, supra note 15, at 28-30 (providing an historical account of attorney’s fees and their
dilution).
116. Lorraine Wright Feuerstein, Two-Way Fee Shifting on Summary Judgment or Dismissal: An
Equitable Deterrent to Unmeritorious Lawsuits, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 125, 157 (1995).
117. Stephan Landsman, The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 261, 262 (1998) (stating that a fundamental goal of the contingency fee arrangement is to ensure that
both rich and poor will be able to access the courts and legal counsel).
118. See Feuerstein supra note 116, at 158.
119. Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, supra note 15, at 141. Rowe states:
A fee rule can apply across the board to all or nearly all civil litigation (as is true, for
example, of the English rule), or only to certain types of actions (as with the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988]), or to certain aspects of civil
proceedings (as is the case of fee shifting as a discovery sanction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37.
Id.
120. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.56 (West Supp. 1983), repealed by 1985 Fla. Laws c. 85-175 § 43.
121. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 145/2 (West 2008).
122. See Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, supra note 15, at 141 n.8.
123. See Bruce L. Hay, Fee Awards and Optimal Deterrence, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 505, 511-13
(1995).
124. Inland Dredging Co. v. Panama City Port Auth., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1280 n.2 (N.D. Fla. 2005)
(noting that Florida law requiring parties to bear their own attorney’s fees unless a statute or contract
provides otherwise is in accord with federal law and common law as generally followed throughout the
United States).
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In Florida, as in many other states, attorney’s fees may be awarded to the
prevailing party pursuant to statute or contract.125 Florida courts have “no discretion
to decline to enforce contractual provisions for an award of the prevailing party’s
attorney’s fees any more than any other valid contractual provisions.”126 The
prevailing party, under Florida law, is the one prevailing on the significant issues in the
litigation.127 Finally, “the object of contractual attorney’s fees is to make the prevailing
party whole.”128
In Any Credit Card Company v. Consumer, Consumer appeared entitled to
attorney’s fees pursuant to contract, not because Consumer had entered into a contract
with ACCC, but because it sued Consumer for breach of contract, alleging he was a
party to a contract, which stated in pertinent part:
Promise to Pay. You promise to pay us when due all amounts borrowed when you
or someone else uses your Credit Card Account (even if the amount charged exceeds
your permission), all other transactions and charges to your Credit Card Account and
collections costs we incur, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney’s fees
and court costs. (If we sue you to collect the debt and you win the suit, we will pay
your reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs.)

By successfully showing that ACCC had not met its burden to prove that Consumer
was the person listed on the account statement, Consumer also proved he was not a
party to the contract under which ACCC was suing. Thus, fee-shifting by contract
would not apply because the parties in the lawsuit were not the parties to the contract.
That is, ACCC and Consumer did not agree, or contract, to anything because
Consumer was never in a contract with ACCC—he was not a signatory to the credit
card agreement. Thus, no contract existed between ACCC and Consumer. Pursuant
to Florida law, a party is precluded from claiming attorney’s fees under a contract that
is found to never have existed.129
Consumer also appeared to have a right to attorney’s fees pursuant to section
57.105(7) of the Florida Statutes, which is a mutuality provision for contracting parties.
Section 57.105(7) reads in its entirety:
If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she
is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow
reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action,

125. See Price v. Tyler, 890 So. 2d 246, 250 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Pepper’s Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United
States, 850 So. 2d 462, 465 (Fla. 2003)). See also Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1968) (recognizing
that in Florida attorney’s fees may be awarded to a prevailing party in three circumstances: (1) where
permitted by contract; (2) where authorized by constitutional legislative enactment; and (3) where awarded
for services performed by an attorney in bringing into court a fund or other property).
126. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 595 So. 2d 292, 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). See also
Am. Sign Co. v. Falconer, 696 So. 2d 473, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (contractual rights to attorney’s
fees must be enforced like other provisions in the contract).
127. See Moritz v. Hoyt Enterprises, Inc., 604 So. 2d 807, 810 (Fla. 1992).
128. Nelson v. Marine Group of Palm Beach, Inc., 677 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
129. See David v. Richman, 568 So. 2d 922, 924-25 (Fla. 1990) (answering the certified question of
whether a party is precluded from claiming attorney’s fees under a contract which has been found to never
have existed in the affirmative); Gibson v. Courtois, 539 So. 2d 459, 459 (Fla. 1989) (holding that there
is no basis for an award of attorney’s fees where there was no contract).
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whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to that contract. This subsection
applies to any contract entered into on or after October 1, 1988.

The Florida Legislature enacted section 57.105(7) to bring some equity to
contract negotiations where only one party has a right to recover attorney’s fees in
enforcing a contract.130 That is, the statute ensures that “each party gets what it
gives.”131 According to the legislative history, the effect of this provision
would provide that if a contract allowed one party to recover attorney’s fees when he
is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court could also award
attorney’s fees to the other party if that party prevailed in any action related to the
contract, whether the other party was plaintiff or defendant in the action.132

Therefore, in the credit card context where so often the credit card agreement only
provides unilateral attorney’s fees for the prevailing credit card issuer, this provision
would allow bilateral attorney’s fees, allowing any party to recover these fees if it
prevailed against the other party in an action related to the contract. Thus, ACCC
could recover its attorney’s fees had it prevailed in the lawsuit, and presumably
Consumer could recover his attorney’s fees if he prevailed with respect to the contract.
Here, however, Consumer prevailed, but not with respect to that contract. That is,
Consumer was adjudged not to be a party to the credit card agreement in question.
ACCC filed a breach of contract action and attached a generic contract under
which it sought attorney’s fees and costs. Assuming ACCC had shown that Consumer
was a party to the contract, then it would have been entitled to the judgment and
attorney’s fees had it prevailed. Instead, Consumer prevailed and showed that he was
not a party to the contract; therefore, arguably, he should be entitled to his attorney’s
fees. Otherwise, Consumer, a wrongly identified party—a putative debtor—would not
be made whole, which is the very purpose for awarding attorney’s fees; yet, ironically,
now Consumer is in debt with attorney’s fees to pay—a classic Pyrrhic victory.
Florida courts have interpreted section 57.105(7) to mean that where a party who
is sued under a contract proves that he or she is not a party to the contract, then he or
she is not entitled to attorney’s fees. That is, the courts defer to Florida common
law—the American rule—and require each party to bear its own expense of attorney’s
fees. Because of the legislative history of this section, it is hard to suggest that courts
read the section more broadly to include scenarios such as Any Credit Card Company
v. Consumer because ultimately it is determined that no contract even exists.

130. See Inland Dredging, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 (noting that these mutuality provisions are
commonplace in various types of contracts, including promissory notes, which tend to give the holder of
the note the right to recover attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing the note, and thus if the debtor prevails
in litigation with respect to the note, the debtor may recover attorney’s fees).
131. Id. at 1283.
132. S. STAFF ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT (Apr. 14, 1988) (Bill No. and Sponsor: S.B.
215, Sen. Grant). See also H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS & ECOMONIC IMPACT STATEMENT (Jan. 17, 1988) (Bill
No. and Sponsor: H.B. 114, Rep. Drage) (reporting that at the time various Florida statutes provided
attorney’s fees for prevailing parties in particular types of contracts and that this proposed provision would
apply to any contract that had a unilateral fee provision).
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A leading case on this point is Florida Medical Center, Inc. v. McCoy,133 where
a patient’s wife was found not to have assumed a responsibility for payment of the
hospital bill after signing an assignment of benefits form as her husband’s
representative. Therefore, the court found that she did not incur an obligation to pay
attorney’s fees under the provision in which the signatory would be responsible for
reasonable attorney’s fees if the suit was instituted to collect on the hospital bill.134
Thus, there was no basis to invoke the compelled mutuality provision under section
57.105(7). That is, the court held that a non-party to a contract (here, a contract did
exist) having no obligations under the contract, has no right to recover attorney’s fees
under section 57.105(7) when prevailing on a claim for breach of the contract. This
has remained Florida courts’ interpretation of section 57.105(7). Thus, in Florida, a
prevailing debtor in credit card contractual litigation cannot recover attorney’s fees
upon a showing that he or she is not a party to the contract in question. As such,
Consumer was not made whole, and thus, the purpose behind the attorney’s fee
provisions was not effectuated.
B. Analysis Under Other Jurisdictions
Presently, several other states have fee-shifting provisions.135 Some states’ fee
shifting provisions, however, extend further than those of other states. California’s
mutuality provision, section 1717(a) of the Civil Code, seems to extend the furthest in
statutory language and judicial interpretation. Section 1717(a) reads in its entirety:
In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that
attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded
either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined
to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in
the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other
costs.
Where a contract provides for attorney's fees, as set forth above, that provision
shall be construed as applying to the entire contract, unless each party was
represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of the contract, and the fact
of that representation is specified in the contract.
Reasonable attorney's fees shall be fixed by the court, and shall be an element
of the costs of suit. Attorney's fees provided for by this section shall not be subject
to waiver by the parties to any contract which is entered into after the effective date

133. 657 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
134. Id. at 1252. See also Univ. Ctr. Hotel, Inc. v. P.C.D. Constr., Inc., 323 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 2005) (citing McCoy for the proposition that where a claim for attorney’s fees is based on contract and
there is no contract, then it is not possible for a claim to arise from the contract and thus attorney’s fees may
not be recovered on the contract); Fielder v. Weinstein Design Group, Inc., 842 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003) (stating that where a party is found not to be a party to a contract, he cannot recover
attorney’s fees nor can they be assessed against him as a non-party).
135. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (West 2008); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717 (West 2008); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 28-3-704 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20.096 (West 2003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5 (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE.
ANN. § 4.84.330 (West 2006).
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of this section. Any provision in any such contract which provides for a waiver of
attorney's fees is void.136

It allows prevailing, nonsignatory contracting parties to recover attorney’s fees.
Thus, if a creditor sues a putative debtor under a credit card agreement and the putative
debtor successfully shows that he is not the contracting party, the putative debtor is
entitled to his attorney’s fees under the California statute. Such a provision actually
provides total consumer protection for the alleged debtor, and thus, the underlying
purpose of consumer protection is actually realized.137
Initially, California appellate courts interpreted section 1717 inconsistently. Some
courts held that only parties to the contract could recover fees under section 1717,138
while other courts faced with similar fact patterns came to the opposite conclusion.139
Finally, the California Supreme Court addressed the issue in Reynolds Metals Co. v.
Alperson.140
In Reynolds, the plaintiff filed a creditor’s claim against defendants who were
alleged to be “alter egos” of two bankrupt companies.141 The court found for the
defendants and awarded attorney’s fees.142 Upon the plaintiff’s appeal, the Supreme
Court of California held: “Had plaintiff prevailed on its cause of action . . . , defendants
would have been liable on the notes. Since [defendants] would have been liable for
attorney’s fees pursuant to the fees provision had plaintiff prevailed, they may recover
attorney’s fees pursuant to section 1717 now that they have prevailed.”143 Thus, the
defendants, as the prevailing party, may recover their attorney’s fees pursuant to
section 1717 because it includes persons who had not signed the contract, but were
sued on it and determined not to be in privity of contract with the credit card company.

136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717(a) (West 2008) (emphasis added).
137. Int’l Billing Serv., Inc. v. Emigh, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1175, 1188 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that
section 1717’s purposes would be thwarted and attorney’s fees claims used as tools of oppression if the
statute did not allow attorney’s fees for non-signatories who were sued under a contract, and would
additionally pressure parties to settle unmeritorious claims). See also Kent S. Scheidegger, Comment,
Attorney’s Fees and Civil Code 1717, 13 PAC. L.J. 233, 236 (1981) (section 1717 is a consumer protection
statute enacted to “protect persons of limited means who sign contracts with those in a superior bargaining
position”) (quoting Enrolled Bill Memorandum to Governor Reagan from his legislative secretary, June 5,
1968 (chaptered bill file 68-AB563, California State Archives)).
138. See, e.g., Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (relying on legislative
intent to reject the argument that the phrase “whether he is the party specified in the contract or not” meant
that any prevailing party in contract litigation containing an attorney’s fees clause is entitled to fees). See
also, Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. v. Wilkoski, 78 Cal. App. 3d 477, 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (finding
no right to attorney’s fee where parties were not in privity with one another).
139. See, e.g., Babcock v. Omansky, 31 Cal. App. 3d 625, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (“As the language
of the statute expressly indicates, a party need not be a signatory to the contract in order to recover
attorney’s fees as the prevailing party—as such prevailing party he becomes entitled to attorney’s fees
‘whether he is the party specified in the contract or not.’”). See also Care Constr., Inc. v. Century
Convalescent Ctrs., Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 701, 707 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (allowing nonsignatory defendant
to recover attorney’s fees under a mutuality theory); Pas v. Hill, 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 535-36 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (holding a nonsignatory could recover attorney’s fees under an estoppel theory).
140. 599 P.2d 83 (Cal. 1979).
141. Id. at 84.
142. Id. at 84-85.
143. Id. at 86 (citation omitted).
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The California Supreme Court essentially articulated a two-part test to determine
whether a nonsignatory to a contract may recover attorney’s fees under section 1717.
The first part requires that the nonsignatory be “sued on a contract as if he were a party
to it,” and the second part requires that the signatory be “clearly entitled to attorney’s
fees should he prevail in enforcing the contractual obligation against the [nonsignatory
party].”144 Thus, the California Supreme Court interpreted section 1717 as allowing
contractual nonsignatory parties to recover attorney’s fees.
Although this interpretation has been criticized as leading to potential problems,
several benefits have also been recognized. One commentator addressed the potential
problems presented by the court’s approach and argued that the current interpretation
of section 1717 has no statutory basis in the language or history of the statute;145 that
the interpretation conflicts with basic contract principles that require parties to be
bound only by contractual provisions to which they have agreed;146 and that the
justification theories of estoppel and mutuality are over-inclusive and result in
inconsistent results.147 As a consequence, he concludes that these perceived problems
will ultimately cause increased litigation costs and distrust in the court system because
judges will rely upon what is fair as opposed to the contractual obligations of the
parties.148 On the other hand, he also noted that such “fee-shifting is more equitable,
it encourages meritorious claims and discourages frivolous claims, it properly
compensates prevailing parties, it punishes losing parties who bring frivolous claims,
and it encourages settlement.”149 Interestingly, he concluded that arguments in favor
of fee-shifting are weaker than arguments against it.150
When one considers the express statutory purposes behind section 1717,
arguments in favor of the Reynolds interpretation appear to effectuate the purposes of
section 1717.151 Nevertheless, under California law, Consumer would have been able
to recover his attorney’s fees and thus, be made whole.
California is the trendsetter in its language and interpretation of its mutuality
provision and other states have followed California to some extent. For example,
Oregon and Washington have language substantially similar to the language in section
1717, which suggests that nonsignatories to a contract may recover attorney’s fees.152

144. Id. at 85.
145. See Robert S. Miller, Attorney’s Fees for Contractual Non-Signatories Under California Civil
Code Section 1717: A Remedy in Search of a Rationale, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 535, 565-66 (1995)
(arguing that the statutory language, “whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not,” may
refer “to parties to the contract who are not specifically granted a right to recover attorney’s fees by the
contract, or . . . it could have the broader meaning of including non-parties as well”).
146. Id. at 567.
147. Id. at 568-79.
148. Id. at 579.
149. Id. at 580.
150. Id. at 589.
151. See Reynolds Metal Co., 599 P.2d at 85 (noting the legislature’s purposes to create mutuality of
remedy where a contract makes recovery of attorney’s fees for only one party and to avoid oppressive use
of one-sided attorney’s fees provisions).
152. See Herzog Aluminum, Inc. v. Gen. Am. Window Corp., 692 P.2d 867, 871 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)
(“With the exception of a few additional words, [the Washington statute] is a duplicate of the Cal. Civ.
Code § 1717 (Deering 1971) which had been adopted and judicially interpreted prior to 1977.”); Golden
W. Insulation, Inc. v. Stardust Inv. Corp., 615 P.2d 1048, 1057-58 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (noting “the
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In Golden West Insulation, Inc. v. Stardust Investment Corp.,153 the Oregon Court
of Appeals examined section 20.096 of the Oregon Revised Statutes154 to determine
“whether a litigant who was not a signatory party to a contract can recover fees.”155
The court held that the defendant, who was assigned the rights and obligations under
the contract with the plaintiff, but who was not a party to the contract, could recover
attorney’s fees.156 Recognizing that California had already addressed the issue, the
court followed California case law and reasoned that had the plaintiff prevailed at trial,
it would have been entitled to attorney’s fees; and because the defendant had to hire
counsel and defend the suit, the defendant was entitled to attorney’s fees when he
prevailed.157 But this holding was subsequently limited—or clarified—in Stevens v.
Foren,158 where the court determined that Golden West “stands only for the proposition
that one who is sued on the contract as an assignee has an entitlement to attorney fees
equal to that of the signatory parties.”159
In Herzog Aluminum, Inc. v. General American Window Corp.,160 the Washington
Court of Appeals examined whether a defendant could receive attorney’s fees under
section 4.84.330 of the Washington Revised Code.161 Similar to Golden West, the

California statute on the award of attorney’s fees in a contract action is substantially similar to [the] Oregon
statute”).
153. 615 P.2d 1048 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
154. The statute presently provides:
(1) In any action or suit in which a claim is made based on a contract, where such
contract specifically provides that attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the provisions
of the contract shall be awarded to one of the parties, the party that prevails on the claim,
whether that party is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to
reasonable attorney fees in addition to costs and disbursements.
(2) Attorney fees provided for in a contract described in subsection (1) of this section
shall not be subject to waiver by the parties to any such contract that is entered into after
September 9, 1971. Any provision in such a contract that provides for a waiver of attorney
fees is void.
(3) As used in this section and ORS 20.097, "contract" includes any instrument or
document evidencing a debt.
OR. REV. STAT. § 20.096 (West 2003) (emphasis added).
155. Golden West Insulation, 615 P.2d at 1057.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1058.
158. 959 P.2d 1008 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
159. Id. at 1013. See also Glaser v. Rock Creek Country Club, Inc., 683 P.2d 114, 116 (Or. Ct. App. 1984),
rev. denied, 687 P.2d 796 (Or. 1984) (finding that the contractual provision was not a provision providing for
attorney’s fees; it was just an indemnity provision running from an insurer to its insured); John Deere Co. v.
Epstein, 755 P.2d 711, 715, aff’d, 769 P.2d 766 (Or. 1988 ) (holding that a party may not avoid the contract
and simultaneously at the same time claim the benefit of the provision for attorney fees).
160. 692 P.2d 867, 869-70 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
161. The statute provided:
In any action on a contract or lease entered into after September 21, 1977, of such contract
or lease, shall be awarded to one of the parties, the prevailing party, whether he is the party
specified in the contract or lease or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in
addition to costs and necessary disbursements. Attorney's fees provided for by this section
shall not be subject to waiver by the parties to any contract or lease which is entered into
after September 21, 1977. Any provision in any such contract or lease which provides for
a waiver of attorney's fees is void. As used in this section "prevailing party" means the party
in whose favor final judgment is rendered.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.330 (West 2006).
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plaintiff sued the defendant on a contract containing an attorney’s fees provision.162
The defendant prevailed at trial on the theory that no contract had been formed
between himself and the plaintiff.163 Thus, the trial court awarded the defendant
attorney’s fees.164 Noting that California addressed this issue in Reynolds, and that
Oregon (also with a statute of similar wording) addressed the issue in Golden West, the
Washington court held that the broad language in “any action on a contract” found in
section 4.84.330 includes any action in which it is alleged that a person is liable on a
contract, and thus defendant who successfully proved an absence of an enforceable
contract was properly entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees incurred at
trial.165 Herzog was distinguished, however, in Wallace v. Kuehner,166 where the court
noted that in Herzog and the cases which followed, there was intention to form a
contract, as opposed to Wallace in which there was not an intention to form a contract,
and thus the prevailing party was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.167 More
recently, in Labriola v. Pollard Group, Inc., the Washington Supreme Court awarded
a prevailing party attorney’s fees even where the contract containing the attorney’s fees
provision was invalidated.168 However, in Labriola, the contract was deemed invalid,
unlike in Wallace, where there was neither a contract nor an intention to form one.
Other states have fee-shifting statutes, but they are drafted more narrowly than in
California, Oregon, and Washington.169 California seems to be setting the trend of
ensuring the comprehensive nature of its consumer protection statute through its broad
interpretation.170
Analyzing Any Credit Card Company v. Consumer under Florida law and
California law would result in entirely different results. Florida courts would refuse
attorneys fees because Consumer was not a party to the contract. But, California courts
might determine that (1) Consumer was “sued on a contract as if he were a party to it,”
and (2) the signatory party (ACCC) would have been “clearly entitled to attorney’s fees
should [it] prevail in enforcing the contractual obligation against the nonsignatory
party” (Consumer). Finding both to be true, a California court would seemingly have

162. Herzog Aluminum, 692 P.2d at 868-69.
163. Id. at 869.
164. Id. at 871-72.
165. Id. at 872.
166. 46 P.2d 823 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
167. Id. at 831.
168. 100 P.3d 791, 798 (Wash. 2004).
169. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-704
(West 2008); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2756.5 (West 2008).
170. California is also setting a trend by requiring that arbitration companies publicly disclose pertinent
details of their arbitration cases and that they will not be liable for such publication. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1281.96 (West 2004) (mandating publication of the name of the nonconsumer party, type of dispute
involved, which party prevailed, on how many prior occasions the nonconsumer party has been in
arbitration or mediation by the private arbitration company, whether the consumer party had legal
representation, date of arbitration demand, arbitrator appointment and disposition of arbitration, manner
in which the dispute was disposed (e.g., settlement, withdrawal, default, hearing), amount of the claim,
award and any other relief granted, arbitrator’s name, arbitrator’s fee, and how the fee was allocated
between the parties). Another trend California is setting is not permitting attorneys to litigate in small
claims courts. See California Courts Self-Help Center: Small Claims, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/
smallclaims (stating that lawyers cannot represent parties in California small claims court).
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awarded Consumer his attorney’s fees. Thus, the Florida law fails to provide adequate
consumer protection and the California law ensures that all, even nonsignatories who
have to defend themselves against suit under a contract to which they are not parties,
have adequate legal access in these kinds of credit card cases where the amount in
question is generally minimal. Because of the prominent place that credit scores have
taken in loans, insurance, and other financial products, consumers cannot afford to
gamble when deciding whether to vigorously defend themselves against credit card
issuers.171
Thus, it remains that something needs to be done to bring relief to putative
debtors. If our society believes that everyone should have adequate access to legal
representation, then change is even more critical.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
“Legal scholars have long recognized the need for a practical solution to the
problem of unfairness in consumer contracts.”172 That inherent unfairness, coupled
with the credit card industry’s abusive lending and debt collection practices, suggests
that action must be taken soon.
Because of the well-documented credit card industry abuses, federal and state
governments are becoming more active in their efforts to protect consumers.173
Meanwhile, the credit card industry is cutting back its zero percent interest offers and
mail solicitations.174 These efforts are laudable and quite necessary, but they still do
not address the issues surrounding the putative debtor who is ultimately adjudged to
be the wrong party sued. “The effectiveness of a consumer protection law usually can
be prejudged accurately by its enforcement mechanism.”175 Although there exists state
legislation designed to protect consumers, often the legislation simply does not go far
enough or its ultimate goals are too narrow.176 Most states do not provide any real
protection for putative debtors who prove that they are the wrong party in debt
collection cases, but some viable solutions do exist.

171. See Richard Burnett, Woman Wins Historic Jury Verdict from Equifax, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec.
4, 2007, at A1 (reporting that because of an identity mix-up, a consumer had her credit ruined and was
denied student loans, credit card accounts, and other financial products).
172. Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1333 (1982).
173. See, e.g., Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5244, 110th Cong. (2008)
(amending, among other things, TILA to establish fair and transparent practices relating to credit extension
under an open end consumer credit plan); Liz Pulliam Weston, The Credit Card Party is Officially Over,
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/CreditCardSmarts/TheCreditCardPartyIsOfficiallyOver.a
spx?page=1 (last visited Dec. 21, 2008) (reporting that Congress held hearings on the “controversial”
practices in the credit card industry in 2007 and that Democratic Rep. Carolyn Maloney introduced a bill
that would prevent those practices and require 45 days advance notice of any changes in rates or terms).
174. See Weston, supra note 173 (reporting the decline of zero percent interest rate offers and the drop
in direct mail solicitations).
175. Ronald L. Hersbergen, Consumer Protection, 41 LA. L. REV. 443, 443 (1980-81).
176. See, e.g., Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559.55 (West 2008);
Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.111 (West 2008).
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A. Legislative Action
1. Follow the Trend
One solution is for Florida and other states to follow California’s lead. Attorney’s
fees provisions are substantive law177 and it is the responsibility of each state’s
legislature to enact substantive changes.178 For example, Florida could adopt
California’s mutuality provision language and interpretation of section 1717, as well
as its legislative purposes. Section 1717 appears to be the most comprehensive law
that would allow adequate consumer protection in these types of cases. Considering
that the California Supreme Court has recently been branded as the “most influential
state court in the nation,” following California’s trend would not be unusual.179
Following California’s trend would be the most equitable approach. In the case
of Any Credit Card Company v. Consumer, for example, if the creditor had prevailed
it would have received attorney’s fees, but the putative debtor who prevailed was
denied attorney’s fees.
Such a rule would also discourage frivolous claims by credit card issuers and
would encourage debtors to raise small, meritorious claims and defenses. Additionally,
the putative debtor would be made whole, which in turn would encourage settlement
for both parties. As it stands now, however, creditors have no real reason to settle,
especially when they are able to come to court suing under a breach of contract cause
of action without the parties’ contract and argue that some innocent consumer is a party
to the contract—as was the case in Any Credit Card Company v. Consumer. In this
case, the appellate court was aware that the credit card issuer did not have a signed
agreement with him, but it found that the credit card issuer’s billing statement delivered
to his old address was sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment and
reverse the trial court. However, this outcome is not unusual in these kinds of cases.180
Adopting California’s approach to awarding attorney’s fees seems unlikely, given
the credit card industry’s power and the legislature’s preference for credit card issuers.
Such biases are evidenced by the BAPCPA and other federal and state pro-creditor
laws. The current climate in America, however, appears to be growing increasingly
adverse to the credit card industry’s controversial practices.181 Moreover, the federal

177. See Bitterman v. Bitterman, 714 So. 2d 356, 363 (Fla. 1998) (quoting L. Ross, Inc. v. R.W. Roberts
Constr. Co., 466 So. 2d 1096, 1098 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (“The ability to collect attorney’s fees from
an opposing party, as well as the obligation to pay such fees, is substantive in nature.”).
178. TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995).
179. See Adam Liptak, Around the U.S., High Courts Follow California’s Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2008, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/us/11bar.html?_r=1&ref=us&oref=slogin
(referring to a study that determined that California’s high court was followed more than any other state).
180. As one author explains:
[C]redit card companies, or the debt buyers to whom they sell the debt, often initiate
collection cases against consumers without any documentation of a credit card agreement
signed by the consumer or even periodic statements to show transaction activity. Instead,
they simply offer up an affidavit from an employee in their loss recovery department and/or
sue on an account stated theory. This deprives the consumer of the ability to challenge
erroneous transactions or demonstrate how much of their debt is due to purchases versus
finance charges and junk fees.
Carter et al., supra note 5, at 44-45
181. See, e.g., Weston, supra note 173.
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government’s efforts, pushed by politicians, encourage lenders to aid in the current
financial crisis of many homeowners who are caught in a web of debt, including being
over-mortgaged.182 This recommended solution would only require the state
legislatures to act—not Congress. The financial portfolio of Americans is so poor that
now our politicians—federal and state—who have heretofore been wooed by the credit
card industry lobbyists, may actually denounce the practices of the industry and seek
solutions on behalf of their constituents—the people. Further, it may be that the states’
legislatures did not foresee the dire results of these kinds of cases, and perhaps they
will act, as appears to be the rising trend with the recent intervention by the federal
government and the introduction of congressional bills.
Like other states, Florida has the “offer of judgment” rule, which allows a defendant
to offer a settlement and recover attorney’s fees if the plaintiff receives a judgment at least
twenty-five percent less than the settlement offer.183 One might argue that attorneys
representing putative debtors may now utilize the offer of judgment rule now by offering
a nominal settlement at the start of lawsuits. However, this is exactly what California’s
section 1717 is designed to prevent—pressuring parties to settle unmeritorious claims.
An offer of judgment—being a partial settlement—would likely also have adverse effects
on the defendant’s credit report as well as the defendant’s taxes.184
Moreover, the Florida Legislature has provided for attorney’s fees in various other
analogous statutes. For example, in the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act (FDUTPA),185 a consumer protection law, the Florida Legislature has provided for
statutory attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.186 As with most attorney’s fees
provisions, statutes granting the right to recover attorney’s fees must be strictly
construed because recovery of attorney’s fees is in derogation of the common law.187
Nevertheless, courts have awarded attorney’s fees in a manner that appears broader
than what courts allow under section 57.105(7). Florida courts have awarded

182. 6 Big Lenders to Offer Broad Mortgage Relief, available at http://memphisminute.com/6-biglenders-to-offer-broad-mortgage-relief (last visited Dec. 21, 2008) (reporting that the federal government
is launching “Project Lifeline” where six major mortgage lenders, Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc.,
Countrywide Financial Corp., JP Morgan Chase and Co., Washington Mutual Inc., and Wells Fargo & Co.,
will broaden their efforts to help homeowners with their loans).
183. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79(6)(a) (West 2008). The statute states:
[If] a defendant serves an offer which is not accepted by the plaintiff, and if the judgment
obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than the amount of the offer, the
defendant shall be awarded reasonable costs, including investigative expenses, and
attorney’s fees . . . incurred from the date the offer was served, and the court shall set off
such costs and attorney’s fees against the award.
Id. See also MGR Equipment Corp. v. Wilson Ice Enter., 731 So. 2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. 1999) (quoting the
statutory language of section 768.79 to hold that the buyer’s pretrial offer of judgment was valid).
184. See Birnbaum, supra note 16 (reporting that in debt settlements, consumers may face tax
consequences).
185. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.201(10) (West 2007).
186. See Guyana Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Melbourne Int’l Commc’n Ltd., 329 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir.
2003) (In 1993, the Florida Legislature amended the FDUTPA to provide protection to the “consumering
public at large . . . from those who engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, deceptive,
or unfair acts or practices”).
187. See Ghodrati v. Miami Paneling Corp., 770 So. 2d 181, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (stressing
the need to strictly construe such statutes).
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attorney’s fees to the prevailing party under the FDUTPA when they have found that
the defendant, who prevailed, was erroneously sued. In Smith v. Bilgin,188 one business
sued another under the FDUTPA.189 The defendant argued that the act only applies to
consumer transactions—not for those between businesses.190 Accordingly, the
defendant’s attorney sought attorney’s fees. The court held that the defendant was
entitled to recover its attorney’s fees because the plaintiff failed to establish its claim
under the FDUTPA.191 That is, the defendant was erroneously sued under the
FDUTPA. This is arguably akin to the circumstances in Any Credit Card Company
v. Consumer, where Consumer was erroneously sued under a contract that never
existed between the parties. The lawsuit should have never been filed. As such, he
should be entitled to recover his attorney’s fees.
2. Change the Current Practice
One of the practices unique to the credit card industry is filing lawsuits against
consumers absent a signed credit card agreement.192 This practice does not allow
consumers the ability to challenge the debt.193
In the case of Any Credit Card Company v. Consumer, the appellate court found
that ACCC did not have a credit card agreement signed by Consumer, but nevertheless,
the court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Consumer because
the appellate court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the
identity of Consumer.194 Because ACCC never produced a credit card agreement
signed by the Consumer—to ACCC’s ultimate detriment—it was obvious that it did
not have one.195
The legislature ought to require that a credit card issuer suing under a breach of
contract theory provide the underlying contract between the parties with the consumer’s
signature. Thus, a credit card issuer would have to maintain the original account
application to initiate a lawsuit.196 This would seem to be much easier in this computer
age because companies now store almost all of their information electronically.197 If the

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

534 So. 2d 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 852.
Id. at 852-53.
Id. at 854.
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
Id.
See Unifund, No. 04-158AP. The court explained:
We find that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to the identity of the debtor,
despite no written response or affidavit presented at trial by [ACCC]. While we have noted
[Consumer’s] argument that the credit card agreement is generic (as it does not contain
[Consumer’s] identification, address, or signature), we cannot ignore the conflicting
evidence which arguably indicates that the debt is indeed his.
Id. at 2.
195. See Carter et al., supra note 5, at 45 (“There is evidence that credit card issuers would be unable
to offer up the original agreement or application signed by the cardholder.”).
196. Id. (citing Johnson v. MBNA, 357 F.3d 426, 432 (4th Cir. 2004) (wherein a credit card issuer
admitted in litigation that it discarded original account applications after five years)).
197. David Thompson, Legal Education for a Digital Age 51-52 (Univ. of Denver Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 08-27, 2009) (citing INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS. AT THE
UNIV. OF DENVER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 10 (2008)).

200

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1

legislature does not require credit card issuers to produce the actual credit card
agreement signed by the putative debtor, courts should be leery to find in favor of
credit card issuers that initiate breach of contract actions without the parties’
contract.198
Such a legislative change would reduce the number of consumer debt lawsuits
filed, because many credit card issuers do not have a signed credit card agreement from
the consumer, and would also make the lawsuits easier and quicker to resolve, thus
realizing the goal for a “speedy, inexpensive, and simple” small claims process.
Further, it would restrict the credit card presumptions, which give the upper hand to
credit card issuers at the expense of consumers, and bring some equity in the credit
card industry with respect to litigating these kinds of cases.
3. Mistaken Identity
Another solution may be for the Florida Legislature to include a provision in
section 57.105 that addresses mistaken identity. Specifically, the legislature could
include a provision that provides the prevailing debtor with attorney’s fees when he or
she is erroneously sued by a creditor. This would encourage credit card issuers to
thoroughly investigate when they receive notice that the putative debtor denies the
allegations in the complaint, or else be subject to sanctions. That is, they would be
strictly liable for the damages resulting from the erroneous lawsuit, and the putative
debtor would not have to prove that the credit card issuer knew or should have known
that its claim had no basis in fact or law under section 57.105. This would encourage
creditors to be more cautious in issuing credit cards and punish creditors who file
erroneous lawsuits. Punishing creditors for unscrupulous behavior is not a novel
concept in our country’s financial world.
In bankruptcy law, for example, creditors may seek a determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), wherein the creditor
files a complaint alleging that the debtor used the card without the intention to pay the
resulting bills.199 Because of credit card issuers’ “casual and inadequate lending
practices and irresponsible actions” in mailing unsolicited pre-approved credit cards
to the general public absent a proper investigation as to the creditworthiness of the
consumer, courts have held creditors accountable.200 The courts used § 523(d)201 “as

198. Even an account stated recovery theory in which the debtor has a reasonable amount of time to
dispute the debt or it is presumed to be accurate has the potential for great abuse. In the case of Any Credit
Card Company v. Consumer, such a theory would not have salvaged ACCC’s unsupported claim because
ACCC did not know when, where, or how Consumer allegedly opened the account; ACCC never received
a single payment from Consumer; ACCC was not aware of what was purchased on this account; and ACCC
never received a response from Consumer as to the alleged debt. That is, there was no evidence that
Consumer actually received an account statement from ACCC to have an opportunity to dispute it.
199. See In re Sziel, 206 B.R. 490, 492 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997).
200. Dennis J. Levine & D. Brett Marks, Attorneys’ Fees for Debtors Who Prevail in Credit Card
Adversaries, 72 FLA. B.J. 56, 56 (1998) (citing In re Valdes, Bankr. No. 94-14489-BKC-AJC, 1995 WL
618998 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)).
201. The statute states:
If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt under
subsection (a)(2) of this section, and such debt is discharged, the court shall grant judgment
in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney’s fee for, the proceeding if
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a mechanism to punish creditors.”202 This enforcement mechanism was enacted “to
discourage creditors from initiating false financial statement exceptions to discharge
actions in hopes of obtaining a settlement from an honest debtor anxious to save
attorney’s fees. Such practices impair the debtor’s fresh start.”203 To obtain attorney’s
fees, the debtor must show (1) the creditor requested a dischargeability determination
pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A); (2) the debt is a consumer debt; and (3) the debt was
discharged.204 The creditor, alternatively, may avoid the imposition of attorney’s fees
if it shows: (1) the creditor’s actions were substantially justified and (2) special circumstances exist to make an award unjust.205 Thus, the courts have not only recognized the
abusive lending practices of credit card issuers in the past, but they have reacted by
enforcing the attorney’s fee provision pursuant to the statute.
B. Equitable Powers of the Court
As mentioned above, Florida courts generally “may only award attorney's fees
when such fees are ‘expressly provided for by statute, rule, or contract.’”206 For
decades, Florida courts have had the inherent power to award attorney’s fees due to
attorney misconduct during litigation, even though no statute authorizes such an
award.207 This inequitable conduct doctrine was to allow for attorney’s fees for bad
faith conduct against a party where no statute so provided.208 Attorney’s fee provisions
often have different rationales and
serve one or more of several distinct purposes—such as fairness, full compensation
for legal wrong, punishment for misconduct either in litigation or out of court,
encouragement of favored types of actions, equalization of sides in types of cases that
usually involve resource imbalances, and impact on litigants’ incentives to raise and
pursue claims and defenses.209

the court finds that the position of the creditor was not substantially justified, except that the
court shall not award such costs and fees if special circumstances would make the award
unjust.
11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (2007).
202. Levine & Marks, supra note 200, at 56.
203. Wells Fargo Fin. Nat’l Bank v. D’Alessandria (In re D’Alessandria), Bankr. No. 05-14163-BKCAJC, 2006 WL 4347091, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 365 (1977); S.
REP. NO. 95-989, at 80 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5866, 6321). See also In re Sziel,
206 B.R. at 492 (reporting that a vast number of consumers are in “precarious financial condition when
they file bankruptcy . . . that they can ill afford to pay additional fees to defend a lawsuit. These
circumstances create a risk that the card issuers may coerce settlements from unrepresented consumers or
obtain default judgments, regardless of the merits of the complaint.”).
204. See In re D’Alessandria, 2006 WL 4347091, at *2.
205. Id.
206. Bane v. Bane, 775 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Hubbel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 758 So.
2d 94, 97 (Fla. 2000)).
207. See U.S. Sav. Bank v. Pittman, 86 So. 567, 572 (Fla. 1920) (awarding attorney’s fees where the trial
court found that the attorney conducted needless foreclosure proceedings for the sole purpose of increasing
his attorney’s fees, contrary to the desires of his client).
208. See Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So. 2d 221, 222-24 (Fla. 2002) (noting that the trial court and the
appellate court did not base their awards on section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes, allowing for attorney’s
fees where there is a lack of a justiciable issue based in law or fact).
209. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract with America, Loser-Pays
Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317, 319 (1998) (citing Thomas D.
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Considering the equitable powers and inherent authority of the court to award
attorney’s fees absent contract, statute, or rule, coupled with the purposes behind
attorney’s fees, the court should explore awarding attorney’s fees in consumer credit
cases in which the putative debtor prevails and the court finds that there is no other
basis to award attorney’s fees.
The purposes behind attorney’s fees would provide the exception to the American
rule based on equity. Thus, the basis of such an award would be an equity-based
argument of fairness. It is simply unfair for a putative debtor to have to defend him or
herself in consumer credit cases where the amounts may be so minimal that it is
difficult to find legal representation. In addition, it is unfair to place the burden of
proof on a putative debtor to show that the credit card issuer sued erroneously and yet,
the putative debtor is saddled with a debt owed to his or her attorney. Alternatively,
if the putative debtor is not able to obtain an attorney, he or she will likely lose the case
against the credit card issuer.210 The equitable solution of allowing attorney’s fees is
needed where the laws are slanted toward credit card issuers. Specifically, when a
credit card issuer can sue a consumer without having the credit card agreement signed
by the consumer or even a transaction account history, more protections are needed to
ensure that these wrongly sued parties are made whole.
Currently, Florida judges have statutory authority to impose sanctions if the
court determines that the losing party or its attorney knew or should have known that
a claim or defense was unsupported by material facts needed to establish the claim or
defense, or would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to the
material facts under section 57.105.211 The courts addressing claims under this statute
have been awarding attorney’s fees more often under this provision since its 1999
amendments, which make the statute broader than it was previously.212
However, this provision still does not reach far enough to tackle cases such as Any
Credit Card Company v. Consumer, where the appellate court reversed the trial court’s
order of summary judgment in favor of the putative debtor, finding that there was a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the identity of the debtor, even though the
credit card issuer failed to provide a written response to Consumer’s motion for
summary judgment or an affidavit, and the credit card issuer was relying upon a
generic credit card agreement and not one expressly between it and Consumer.
Moreover, with the state law presumption that a credit card statement mailed to a
consumer is accurate,213 it would be extremely challenging for a consumer to show that

Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653-66
(1992)).
210. See Elwell & Carlson, supra note 22.
211. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105(1) (West 2008).
212. See John P. Fenner, New § 57.105 Lawyer Sanctions, Our Ethics, and the Florida Constitution:
Recent Developments and a Respectful Dissent, 77 FLA. B. J., May 2003, at 26; see also Gary S. Gaffney
& Scott A. Mager, Section 57.105’s New Look: The Florida Legislature Encourages Courts to Sanction
Unsupported Claims and Dilatory Actions, 76 FLA. B. J., Apr. 2002, at 8 (stating that the new amendments
to section 57.105 will “discourage lazy or unscrupulous litigants (and their legal counsel) from asserting
unsupported claims or defenses, or acting in any way to delay civil proceedings”); Moakley, 826 So. 2d at
223 (noting the statute is broader than it had been before the 1999 amendments).
213. See supra note 33.
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there was no justiciable claim in these kinds of consumer collection cases,214 especially
after a reversal by an appellate court.
VII. CONCLUSION
If the object of contractual attorney’s fees is to make the prevailing party whole,
then the law as it exists today is inadequate. Not only is it inadequate, but it is causing
erroneously sued consumers to go deeper into debt. This prospect is unsettling
considering that many Americans are in debt, and the United States is in a financial
crisis that is predicted to become worse.
For far too long, our elected officials have been in the pockets of the credit card
issuers, resulting in laws that increasingly favor big businesses at the expense of the
poor. Banks persuaded Congress to deregulate and end consumer protection against
usury. Entities are lending payday loans, subprime loans, and other financial products
to poor people at higher interest rates. Health crises, job losses, and divorces have
Americans getting behind on their credit card debt. Health care, housing costs, and
college tuition have skyrocketed. Our nation is in an economic crisis.
If Congress will not protect its constituents, then state legislatures must act. If
state legislatures fall short, then our courts must be prepared to end the financial
irresponsibility targeting our most vulnerable citizens. How does it profit America for
most of its citizens to be in unmanageable debt?215

214. See, e.g., Wendy’s of N.E. Fla., Inc. v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(reversing an award for attorney’s fees where the court found that Wendy’s position was not wholly
unsupported by the facts at any time before the final summary judgment).
215. Since the completion of this Article, the world’s credit markets have seized up and thus credit card
issuers have tightened their lending standards for all potential creditors. Sara K. Clarke, Orlando-Area
Mom-and-Pop Businesses Hanging by Thread, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 16, 2009, http://www.orlando
sentinel.com/business/custom/thrifty/orl-nohelp1609feb16,0,7763422.story. In March 2008, Warren
Buffet, a skilled investor, declared that the United States was in a recession, even though it had not reported
two consecutive quarterly falls in gross domestic product, which technically defines a recession. Suzy
Jagger and Dearbail Jordan, Warren Buffett Declares America in Recession, TIMES ONLINE, Mar. 3, 2008,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article3476265.ece.
Since that time, “credit markets seized up as confidence in the nation’s financial system ebbed and people
rushed to put money in Treasuries, the safest of investments.” Vikas Bajaj and Jack Healy, Stocks Drop
Sharply and Credit Markets Seize Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/
business/21markets.html?fta=y. To date, the weak economy has taken a toll on the lending confidence, and
even though lending rates have decreased, banks continue to be concerned about the credit quality of
borrowers and thus banks are not lending as liberally as they had been. Ben Rooney, Credit Strained by
Skittish Lenders, CNN Money.com, Jan. 23, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/23/markets/credit. Thus,
the financial crisis in the United States has shifted the manner in which banks lend from liberal, careless
lending targeting the riskiest borrowers (working poor, consumers with blemished histories, single mothers,
senior citizens and college students) to borrowers with more established credit-worthy histories.

